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RECENT CASES.
ADmINISTRATORS-MISCONDUCT-COMMISSIONS.-IN RE GALL, 95 N. Y. SuPP.
124.-Where an administratrix has been guilty of misconduct, held, that on
the settlement of her account, the surrogate may, in his discretion, deny her
statutory commissions.
Such is the general rule. Hall v. Wilson, r4 Ala. 295; State ex rel.
Wolf v. Berning, 74 Mo. 87. Though the contrary has been held. In re
Fitzgerald, 57 Wis. 508. But the misconduct must consist of fraud, gross
negligence, or wilful default causing loss to the estate. Smith v. Kennard's-
Ez'r, 38 Ala. 695; St. Paul Trust Co. v. Kittson, 62 Minn. 408. And unwise
administration unaccompanied by fraud and bad faith, where long delay in
accounting was without excuse, has been held sufficient. In re Atherton's
Estate, 8 Knep. ISO. But, on the other hand, that unfaithful administration on
the part of an executor will not deprive him of compensation for his services
so far as they have been beneficial to the estate. See Jennison v HaAgood,
1o Pick. 77.
ADVERSE POSSESSIoN-CoLoR OF TITLE-TAX DEEDS.-BRANNAN V. HENRY,
39 So. 92 (ALA.).-Held, that a tax deed, though void as a muniment of title,
is admissible to show color of title to support adverse possession if it suffi-
ciently describes the land.
The tendency has been to support this proposition. Some federal decis-
ions have rejected it in the past, but the most recent cases support it where
the deed is not void on its face. Truce v. Am. Ass., 122 Fed. 598, 58 C. C. A.
266; Bartlett v. Ambrose, 42 U. S. App. 381. The older cases followed it
rather on the ground of the accuracy of the description of the land. Harri-
son v. Spencer, go Mich. 586; Rensens v. Lawson, 91 Va. 226; Edgerton v.
Bird, 6 Wis. 527. And some even where the property was inaccurately
described. Smith v. Shattock, 12 Ore. 362; Childs v. Shower, is Iowa 26r.
Contra, Berendo v. Kaiser, 66 Tex. 352. Color of title can be claimed only
for as much as is described. Stevens v. Johnson, 55 N. H. 405. In the fol-
lowing cases claims of color of title under invalid tax deeds were not allowed.
Mloore v. Brown, i How. 424; Matterson v. Devoe, is Kan. 223; Brougher
v. Stone, 72 Miss. 647.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY ON BOND.-HAYES V.
BRONSON, 61 ATL. 549 (CoNN.).-An attorney, while acting for a firm as plain-
tiffs in a replevin suit, signed the replevin bond "John Doe, Attorney for
Plaintiff.'-Held, that he bound himself personally and not his clients.
A principal cannot be charged on a bill drawn by "A. B., agent." Pentz
v. Stanton, 1o Wend. 271. A Court of Equity will look beyond the form of
execution, and, having ascertained the intention of the signer, will, if possible,
give the effect intended. Starh v. Stark, 94 U. S. 477. An unsealed instru-
ment signed in'the name of the agent binds the principal if that intent appears
on its face and the agent has authority. MfcDonald v. Bear River Co., 13
Cal. 220. Even if the agent sign as such and use his own seal he may not be
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personally bound. Delbers v. Del. &' H. C. Co., 4 Wend. 285. But an agent
is not personally liable on a note made by him to one who took it with knowl-
edge of intention to act as agent. Bradley v. McKee, 5 Cranch C. C. 298.
Nor will he be personally bound if contrary intention appears on the face of
the instrument. Haskins v. Edwards, x Iowa, 246. But the attorney has a
remedy over against the principal, if he has acted in good faith. Clark v.
Randall, 9 Wis. I35.
CONTRACTS-EXCLUSIVE CONTRACT FOR PERSONAL SRVCES-INJtmCTION.-
TAYLOR IRON & STEEL CO. V. NICHOLS ET AL., 6i ATL. 946 (N. J. EQ.).-Held,
that where a contract contains an agreement that one shall devote his entire
time to the service of another it does not imply a covenant not to serve a third
party during the period covered by the contract.
Even if employees quit under circumstances showing bad faith equity will
not force them to remain in service against their will. Arthur v. Oakes, 63
Fed. 31o. Employees cannot, while in service, perform some duties and re-
fuse to perform other necessary duties. So. Cal. Ry. v. Rutherford, 62 Fed.
796. The mere fact of an employee's knowledge of the business will not jus-
tify an injunction against violation of his contract. Rogers Mfg. Co. v.
Rogers, 58 Conn.*356. To justify the injunction there must be an express
covenant not to enter the employ of another and also proof of special skill or
expertness. Burney v. Ryle, 91 Ga. 701. Under an exclusive contract for
services when the pecuniary injury would be incapable of proof an injunction
would be granted even in the absence of the negative clause. Col. Club V.
Reilly, ix Ohio Dec. 272. But even under such circumstances the injury
must be irreparable. Sternberg v. O'Brien, 48 N. J. Eq. 370. And not
remediable at law. Hair Co. v. Huckins, 56 Fed. 366. Where performance
for another would violate contract negative clause would be implied. Duff
v. Russell, 133 N. Y. 678. In Hamblin v. Dunneford, 2 Edw. Ch. 529, an
injunction was refused, although there was an express covenant not to per-
form and the breach was acknowledged.
CONTRACTS-PUBLIC POLICY-LABOR UNIONS.-JACOBS V. COHEN, 34 N. Y.
LAw JOUR. 58.-Held, that a tripartite agreement, made by an employer
with a labor union and with his employees, who were members of the union,
in which he contracted not to engage any person, who was not a member of
the union and in good standing, and to discharge any person who should fail
to keep up his standing in the union, is not an agreement in violation of any
public policy.
Both opinions in this case spend much time in comparing it with Curran
v. Gallen, r52 N. Y. 33. That case is, however, easily distinguishable. In
Curran vz. Gallen, supra, the purpose of the agreement was to coerce those
who were not parties to it. In this case the employers were parties to the
contract. This distinction is made clear in Stevedore's Ass'n v. Walsh, 2
Daly (N. Y.) I. But see dicta in Peofile v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9. This dis-
tinction is by no means uncommon. Case of the Journeymen Cordwainers of
the City of New York, x18o; (Peofile v. Treguler,) I Wheelers Crim. Cases,
142; Com. v. Hunt, 4 Metc. III. It is recognized by statute in England, 5
Geo. IV., c. 95, sees. II and III. Agreements between employees or between
employers for their common benefit are valid, provided no unlawful means
are used to carry out their ends. Collins v. Locke, 4 App. Cas. 674; Slate v.
Stewart, 59 Vt. 273; Snow v. Wheeler, 113 Mass. 179. It has been held,
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however, that labor is a commodity and that association agreements which
stifle competition between the members of an association are void. Moore vi.
Bennett, 14o 111. 69.
CORPORATIONS-NOTES-PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS.-AUNGST V.
CREQUE, 74 N. E., 1073 (Oaro.).-Held, that a promissory note which reads
"thirty lays after date we promise to pay," etc., and signed ,, The Akron
White Sand and Stone Co., H. K. Mihills, Sec'y and Treas,, D. B. Aungst,
Pres.," is, on its face, the note of the company alone and is not the note of H.
K. Mihills and D. B. Aungst, and the latter are not personally bound thereon.
Although the above decision is in harmony with the law in some jurisdic-
tions, there is a great conflict between the various states and no definite rule
can be laid down in this country as to how a note, signed as in the present
case, will be construed. Thus where a note is made out "we promise to pay,"
etc.. and signed "A B Company, C D Pres.," some states hold that parole
testimony is inadmissible and the company is alone liable. Liebscher v.
Kraus, 71 Wis. 387. On the same set of facts other states hold that parole
testimony is inadmissible but that the agent is personally liable. Mathews v.
Dubugue Mattress Co., 87 Iowa, 246. While still other states admit parole
testimony to remove the ambiguity. Case Mfg. Co. v'. Sazman, 138 U. S.
431; Bean v. Mining Co., 66 Cal. 45z. The same confusion of decisions exist
when the name of the company appears in the margin of the instrument and
it is signed by "A. B. Pres." Compare Carpenter v. Farnsworth, io6 Mass.
561; National Bank v'. Clark, 139 N. Y. 307; and Franklin v. Johnson, 147
IlL 520.
CRIMINAL LAw-SzLF DmZFNsx-DuTY TO RzETxEAT.-STATz v. GARD-
NER, 971 N. W. (MINN.). 97r.-In a trial of homicide, in which there is an at-
tempted justification by self defense, held, that it is reversible error to charge
that such justification can not be made out unless accused in good faith en-
deavored to escape.
The application of the doctrine "retreat to the wall," as stated in Coke
(3 Inst. 55), has been undergoing a change in this country in recent years and
in some of the jurisdictions has been positively relaxed. State v. Matthews,
148 MO. 185; Runyan z. State, 57 nd. 8o. The Supreme Court, in recent
cases, Beard v. United States, r58 U. S. 550, and Rowe v. U. S., 164 U. S.
546, has approved of the modifications of the old common law doctrine and
held that a person "was not obliged to retreat" under the circumstances. The
reason for this change appears to be the general introduction of firearms, and
the recognition by courts that self-defense should not be distorted by an un-
reasonable requirement of the duty to retreat, into self-destruction. Duncan
v. State, 49 Ark. 543.
EVIDENcE-LEASES-COLLATRAL AGRExmENTS.-GRE N v. KERR, 95 N. Y.
Supp. 569.-Held, that an oral agreement to repair during the term as distin-
guished from repairs to be made before the tenancy commenced is not collat-
eral to the written lease and is inadmissable in an action for rent.
The language of this ruling cannot be reconciled with the case of Morgan
v. Griffth, L. R., 6 Exch. 70. Both decisions are, however, consistent with
the undisputed rule that oral conditions, precedent to the obligation of a
written contract, may be shown, and, with its corollary, that a condition sub-
sequent must be contained in the writing to be enforceable. Pym v. Camp-
hell, 6 E. & B. 370; Davis v. Jones, 17 C. B. 625. Apparent inconsistencies
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in the law are due to the very narrow distinctions drawn between the applica-
tion of these two rules of intention. Compare Angell v. Duke, 32 L. T. Rep.
N. S. 320, and Afann v. Nunn, 43 L. T. Rep. C. P. N. S. 24!. Many courts
hold that there must be some ambiguity upon the face of the written instru-
ment before these rules can be applied. Englemrier v. Taylor, 98 N. Y. 788;
Engleorn v. Reitlinger, 122 N. Y. 76. This rule has, however, been criti-
cised as fallacious in theory and practice. 4 Wig. Er'. sec. 2431 (b). The
difficulty in defining a collateral agreement is pointed out in Hall v'. Berton,
38 N. Y. Supp. 979. Each case must stand upon its own particular circum-
stances. 4 Wig. Er,. 2435.
INSURANCE-CONsTRUCTION OF POLICY-" FIRE" DEFINED.-WESTERN
WOOLEN MILL Co. v. NORTHERN AssUR. Co. OF LONDON, 139 Fed. 63 7-Held,
that the word "fire" as used in an insurance policy, in the absence of lan-
guage showing a contrary intention, is to be given its ordinary meaning,
which includes the idea of visible heat and light.
Such is the better and prevailing rule, although there was considerable
conflict in the early cases. Wood on Fire Ins., 237; Gibbons v'. German
Ins. Co., 3o IlL App. 263. But it is not necessary that there be ignition of the
subject matter of the insurance. It is enough that the proximate cause of the
damage be fire. Bolestracci . Fireman's Ins. Co., 34 La. Ann. 844. And
where buildings were blown up under the direction of the chief magistrate of
a city to prevent the spreading of a conflagration, the loss was held to be cov-
ered by an ordinary policy against fire. City Fire Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Cor-
lies, 2X Wend. 367.
JURISDICTIoN-EXCsss OF-LIABILITY OF INFERIOR JUDG.-Rusn v.
BUCxLEY, 61 AT. 774, (ME.).-Where a judge of an inferior court has jurisdic-
tion over the general subject matter of an alleged offense, if he acts in good
faith, he will not be liable in damages for an erroneous decision. Emery, J.,
dissenting.
It is universally conceded that when inferior courts and judicial officers
act without jurisdiction the law can give them no protection whatever. Cooley
on Torts, p. 489. A rather odd reason is that given in Bishoi Non-Contract
Law, Sec. 783; "those judges who receive a small salary should not be com-
pelled to respond in damages for honest mistakes." The leading American
case held in a dictum that if the want of jurisdiction -were known there
could be no exemption from damages of the judge in an inferior court. Brad-
ley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335. Many English cases assert the total exemption of
a judge of record from responsibility or accountability in any way except to
the King. Milter vl. Sears, 2 W. Bl. 1141. The American opinions seem
to be about evenly divided as to the liability of an inferior judge for judgment
under an unconstitutional statute. Kelly v,. Bemis, 70 Mass. 83; Allen v.
Gray; ii Conn. 95; Trescott v. Waterloo, 26 Fed. 592. In Texas the latter
question has been regulated by statute. Sersumas V. Both, 34 Tex. 33s. An
honest purpose would not protect the judge if entirely without authority
of law. Truesdell V, Combs, 33 Ohio, St. I8. The 'distinction between
firimafacie total -want of jurisdiction and bona fide error is well shown in
Robertson v. Parker, 99 Wis. 652.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-DANGEROUS PREMISES-INJURY TO LICENSEE.-
Ross v. JACKSON, 51 S. E. 578 (GA).-Held, that a landlord is liable to one
lawfully present on the rented premises by invitation of the tenant for injuries
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arising from defective construction, or from failure to keep the premises in
repair, where the defect is known to the landlord, or in the exercise of reason-
able diligence could have been known, and the injured person was himself in
the exercise of due care.
Ordinarily there is no warranty on the part of the lessor that the premises
are in good condition and the rule of caveat emp6tor applies. Hill v. Wood-
man, 14 Me. 38. But by letting the premises with some latent defect in them,
such as structural weakness or decay, the landlord impliedly authorizes the
continuance of the nuisance and is liable. Ahern v. State, 2x5 N. Y. 203;
Cowen v. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 363. Furthermore, the liability of the land-
lord extends to injuries sustained by one socially calling on the tenant as well
as to the tenant himself. Henkel v. Muir, 3z Hun (N. Y.) 28. In such cases
the courts have never drawn any line between a person present for business
and one present for pleasure. Campbellv . Portland Sugar Co., 62 Me., 562.
However, if the premises are in good repair when demised, but afterward
become ruinous and dangerous, the landlord is not responsible, therefore,
either to the occupant or the public. Clancy v. Byrne, 56 N. Y. 129.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--DEFECTIVE SIDEWALK-DUTIES OF TRAVELER.-
IDLETT V. CITY OF ATLANTA, 51 S. R. (GA.) 709.-Held, that ordinary diligence
on the part of a person passing along a sidewalk of a public street of a munic-
ipal corporation, and ordinary diligence on the part of the corporation in con-
structing and repairing the sidewalk, do not imply a like degree of vigilance
in foreseeing danger and guarding against it.
Corporations have made strenuous efforts to establish the rule that knowl-
edge of a defect in and subsequent user of a walk would estop a person injured
from claiming damages. Jones Neg. Mun. Corp. sec. 221. But this is not
the law. Ordinarily, as the laying out of the way has established its legal
necessity, the mere fact that one knowing of a defect passes over it will not
defeat his claim should he suffer harm. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 95 Ga.
iio. A person, although knowing a walk is defective, may still use it if his
act in so doing is reasonably prudent. Cit of Emporia v. Schmedling, 33
Kan. 485. Knowledge of danger is not negligenceper se. 4 Am. &- Eng.
Ency. of law, p. 35. Knowlege of the danger is never conclusive evidence
of negligence, but it is a question to be submitted to the jury. Smith v. City
of St. oseph, 45 Mo. 449. However, if the danger arising from a defect in a
street or highway is obviously of such a character that no person in the exer-
cise of ordinary prudence would attempt to pass over the same, or, in other
words, if such attempt would of itself plainly and unequivocally amount to a
want of ordinary care and diligence, the court may so instruct the jury as a
matter of law. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 95 Ga. xio.
NAVIGABLE WATERs-RIGHT OF UPLAND OWNER To REACH.-CONDERT XT
AL V. UNDERHILL ET AL, 95 N. Y. SUM 134.-Held, that an owner of upland
has no right to trespass on the land of another for the purpose of reaching
the navigable waters beyond.
Where the fee of land between high and low water mark is in the state,
an erection of a wharf or pier by an upland proprietor upon this land is not a
trespass and will not be disturbed except in case it become a public nuisance.
Commonwealth v. Wright, 3 Am. Jurist z85. In the present -ase the fee of
the share by an ancient grant rested in a municipal corporation. That a per-
manent dock erected by an upland proprietor on such land under water is a
RECENT CASES.
trespass. Brookhaven v. Smith, 98 App. Div. 212 N.Y. It has been held that
proprietors of lands upon navigable waters are entitled to erect wharves and
piers for their own and the public use in order to gain access to the navigable
parts of the waters. Steamboat Co. v. Vi'sger, 179 N. Y. 2o6. But there the
land in question belonged to the state wherein the present case is distinguish-
able.
NusANc-s-PREsCRIPTION.-OvER v. DEHUE, 75 N. E. 664 (IND.).-In a suit
to restrain defendant from operating his foundry, interfering with the enjoy-
ment by plaintiff of his premises, the evidence showed that defendant had
operated his foundry for twenty years and that plaintiff had occupied his
property for over twenty years. Held, not sufficient to give defendant a pre-
scriptive right to operate the foundry in manner complained of.
It is a well established principle that no lapse of time can confer a right to
maintain a public nuisance. Cooley on Torts, page 730 (2nd Edition); Inhabi-
tants of Charlotte v. Iron Works, 8 L. R. A. 828. And regarding a private
nnisance the mere fact that the business constituting the nuisance was in op-
eration a few years before a party erected a dwelling is no defense to an ac-
tion in the absence of a claim of prescriptive right. Fertilizer Co. z. Malone,
73 Md. 268; Mullig-an v. .Elias, 12 Abb. Prac. (N: S.) 259. Bringing suits
for damages for such use shows sufficiently the want of acquiescence by plain-
tiff. Bunten v. Railway CO., 5o Mo. App. 414. Although defendant in pres-
ent case operated his foundry for prescriptive period with knowledge of plain-
tiff and no complaint from latter, yet the peculiar manner of operating the
foundry which caused the nuisance had not been in existence for tLe entire
period. Therefore, the defendant had no right to maintain it, and decision
was according to the weight of authority. Camfibell v. Seaman, 63 N. Y. 568.
OFFICERS-TERM OF OFFIcE-TERMINATION.-PROWELL V. STATE EX REL.
HASTY ET AL.-39 So. 164 (ALA.).-Held, that the words, "until his succes-
sor is elected and qualified," as used in the Constitution and statutes relative
to the terms of officers, are not intended to prolong the terms of office beyond
such reasonable time after the election as will enable the newly elected officer
to qualify, and after the expiration of such reasonable time, if the newly elected
officer fails to qualify, the office becomes vacant.
At common law there was no rule which gave an individual elected or
appointed to office the right to continue in office after the expiration of the
term limited by law and until a successor was chosen and qualified. Piofile
v. Tieman, 3o Barb, r93. Nevertheless, an officer had the right to continue
to occupy the office as a mere locum tenens and perform the duties incident to
the office. In matter of Woodworth,37 Cal. 614. Where a statute speaks of
a "vacancy" in an office the word has no technical meaning. Peofile v'.
Osborne, 7 Colo. 6o5. An office is not vacant when there is a defacto incum-
bent. Harrison v. Simonds, 44 Conn. 318. The length of time which will
be allowed the officer to quailfy depends upon the statutes creating the office.
Peofile v,. Perkins, 26 Pac. 245. Apparently the principal case is one of first
impression, there being no decision on facts that are precisely similar.
PLEADING-PARTIES-MISNOME-MODE OF OBJECTION.-MCINTOSH COUNTY
COM'RS v. AIKEN, 51 S. -E. (GA.) 585.-Held, that where, in a civil case, the
party proceeded against is designated and described by a wrong name, the
objection of misnomer should be taken by a plea in abatement, and not by a
motion to dismiss.
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At one time a doubt existed as to whether a mistake of the plaintiff's
Christian or surname were not a ground of non-suit. I Chitty's Pleading,
44o. In general, however, a misnomer of defendant is onlypleadable in abate-
ment, and cannot be taken advantage of in arrest of judgment. Stale v.
Knowlton, 70 Me. 200. A misnomer is waived by a failure to plead it or by
a default. Bank v. Jaggers, 31 Ind. 38. Even the want of a charter, or one
with great irregularities, must be pleaded in bar. Rheem vi. Wheel Co., 9
Casey, 348. But here, in a suit in assumbsit against two, one is arrested and
the other returned "not found," and it appears on the trial that defendant
who is not brought in is misnamed in the declaration, being called "John"
instead of" George," plaintiff will fail on the ground of variance. Waterbury
v. Mather, 16 Wend. 61z. In the case of Jackson Th. vz. Barnes, 55 Ind. 136,
where a suit was brought against another and different corporation for a debt
for which it was not liable a demurrer was sustained. Such cases are, how-
ever, exceptional. In some states pleas in abatement have been abolished.
Phillifis v. State, 35 Ark. 384. In New York a misnomer should be set up
,quasiin abatement. White v'. Miller, 7 Hun (N. Y.) 433.
PROMISSORY NOTE-CERTAINTY-EXCHANGE AND COLLECTION CHARGES.-
SMITH V. FIRST STATE BANK OF TYLER, 104 N. W. (MINN.) 369.-Held, An in-
strtiment in the general form of a promissory note, whereby the maker prom-
ises to pay adefinite sum, with exchange and collection charges is not a prom-
issory note.
The rule stated above is in direct conflict with the provisions of the nego-
tiable instruments act, sec. 2, 4, 5. Previous to the enactment of this statute,
the courts in the various states had been nearly evenly divided on the ques-
tion of the negotiability of instruments with such stipulations. In respect to
exchange, the weight of authority being perhaps against negotiability. Win-
sor Sav. Bank v. McMahar, 38 Fed. 283; Culbertson v. Nelson, 93 Iowa
187. And as regards collection charges probably leaning towards the rule as
adopted in the act. Porsey vi. Wo!f, 142 Ill. 589; Afifenheimer v. Farmers
&''Merchants Bank, 97 Tenn. ig; National Bank v. Sutton Afg. Co. 6 U,
S. App. 312. In some states, although such provision is declared void by
statute, the negotiability of the instrument is not affected. Levens v. Briggs,
21 Ore. 333.
TORTS-IMPUTzD NEGLIGENCE-INJURY TO CHILD. -JACKsONvILLz ELEC-
TRIC CO. v. ADAMS, 39 So. 183 (FLA.).-Held, that the contributory negligence
of parents in permitting a child of four to go, unattended, upon the streets of a
city upon which electric cars are operated cannot be imputed to the child in
an action by him against the corporation for damages resulting from its negli-
gence.
There is no conflict in individual states, some following the ruling of the
case in hand, and others adopting the New York rule which hold that such
negligence in parents will prevent child from recovering. Until recently,
however, Kansas, Maryland and Wisconsin were not committed to either doc-
trine. Chicago v. Wilcox, 21 L. R. A. 76 Note. Maryland has now adopted
the New York rule in Cumberland v. Laling, 95 Md. 42. Wisconsin has ap-
proved it in Johnson Adm'r. v. Chicago &- Northeastern R. R. Co., 49 Wis.
529, and the Kansas court seems to assume that parents' negligence would
be a valid defense to action by child. Smith vi. Santa Fe R. R., 25 Kan. 739.
Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, and Minnesota also follbw New York. The
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remaining states hold that negligence of parents is not to be imputed to the
child. Chicago v. Wilcox, supra.
TRADEMARKS-LICINSE TO USE-VALIDITY.-LEA V. NEW HOME SEWING
MACH. Co., 139 FED. 732.-Where a contract licenses the use of a trade mark
or name, to be used by the grantee in a business with which the grantor has
or has had no connection, held, that such contract is a fraud upon the public
and therefore void.
This case follows the fundamental rule that a trade mark cannot be as-
signed nor its use licensed except as incidental to the transfer of the business
or property with which it has been used. MracMahan Pharmacal Co. v. Den-
ver Chemical Mfg. Co., 51 C. C. A. 302. And where the whole pecuniary
value of a name depends solely upon the personal qualities of the one to
whom it belongs, the right to the use of the name is not transmissible. Hege-
man &- Co. v. Hegeman, 8 Daly I; Blakeley v. Sousa, 197 Penn. St. 305.
But this rule has been held to apply only when the name is sought to be tyan-
ferred apart from the business. Kidd v. Johnson, ico U. S. 617; Booth v.
farret, 52 How. Pr. 169. The whole doctrine of assignability and licensing
of trademarks rests upon the consideration whether or not such assignment
would operate as a fraud upon the public and if such be the tendency, it will
be held invalid. Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood, rO8 U. S, 218; Connel
v. Reed, 128 Mass. 477-
TRUSTS-SPENDTHRIFT-ESTATE OF CESTUI QuE TRUSTS.-DuBoIS V. BAR-
BOUR ET AL., 6r ATL. 752 (R.I.).-Held, that, where a trustee is to pay to the
cestuiyue trust sums not exceeding a certain amount, it is not a vested in-
terests and is not subject to cestuz's debts.
Generally in both England and the United States the beneficial interest
cannot be so fenced about by restrictions as to secure to it the inconsistent
characteristics of right of enjoyment to beneficiary and immunity from
creditors. Brandon v. Robinson, i8 Ves. 429; Nichols v. Levy, 5
Wall. 441. But by the weight of authority in the United States where
the trustee has full discretion as to the disbursement of the income
the cestui takes no present estate and creditors cannot levy. Bispham
Eq. p. 96. It is in the power of the parent to place property in the hands of
trustees free from interference by the cestuior creditors. Leavitt v. Beirne,
21 Conn. 8. The spendthrift cestui can appoint an agent to receive the income
to the use but cannot alienate it. In Re Mehaffrey's estate, 139 Pa. 276.
Neither the accrued income in the possession of the trustee nor the accruing
income can be assigned by the cestui. Partridge v. Covender, 96 MO. 452.
Even though the beneficiary has the right under the will to devise the estate
the payment of his debts may be forbidden by the terms of the trust instru-
ment. Hill v. McRae, 27 Ala. 175. Halstead v. Davison, io N. J. Eq. 290,
holds that in the absence of fraud by the cestul his interest cannot be levied
on by creditors even though the disposal of the estate is not at the discretion
of the trustee. But, in some states, statutes forbid the curtailing of the right
of the creditors by any provisions of the trust. Trustee v. Rach, 87 Ky. ix6.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-UNRECORDED DEED-CONSTEUcTIvE NOTICE.-
HARMAN V. SOUTHERN RY., 5I S. E. (S. C.) 689.-Held. that a subsequent pur-
chaser of a tract of land, the owner of which had given a deed to a railroad
for right of way, had constructive notice of the right of way of the railroad
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company, though the deed had not been recorded, from the maintenance and
operation of the road over the land.
Notice is whatever reasonable inquiry would develop. In law, that is
notice of a fact which would provoke a reasonably prudent man to such
inquiries as, pursued with reasonable diligence, would lead to full knowledge.
Chicago &' E. I. R. Co. v'. Wright, 153 Ill. 307. If a license is granted by
a lot-owner to a railroad company to lay and operate tracks on the street in
front of his lots, and the tracks are in operation when the lots are sold, the
purchaser is charged with notice of the license. Merchant's Union Barb
Wire Co. v'. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 79 Iowa, 613. But possession is not
notice except during its continuance, and a vendor is not bound to take notice
of the antecedent possession of third persons. 16 Ency. of Law 8oo. Neither
is a purchaser of lands chargeable with notice of deeds lying outside of his
chain of title. Paul v. R. Co., 51 Ind. 527. This explains the apparently
conflicting case of Irish vz. Sharp, 89 Ill. 26z. In that case, the purchaser
did not derive his title through the person who granted the unrecorded mort-
gage and it did not lie in the proper and regular chain of title. A case directly
in point is Ind. Bloomington &- Western Ry. Co. v. McBrown, 114 Ind. 198.
There the purchaser knew, at the time he bought the land, that the grade for
a railroad track was constructed thereon, and this was held to be sufficient to
put him upon inquiry, and if he failed to make proper inquiry as to the nature
of the claims he bought it at his peril.
